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There is a well-understood economists’ case for a value-added tax (VAT). As 
a consumption tax, a VAT  would not impose the bias against saving that is 
inherent  in  income  taxation  and  could  therefore  help  promote  capital 
formation  and economic  growth. Against  this  advantage  must  be  weighed 
possible disadvantages resulting from higher administrative costs and greater 
difficulty  in  providing  an acceptable  degree of  progressivity  to the overall 
tax-and-transfer structure as well as the possible political costs (or benefits, 
depending  on one’s  point of view)  of  a tax  that  is relatively invisible  and 
thus easy to raise. 
Among  many  businessmen,  however,  the  case for a VAT  is often  stated 
quite differently. They view such a tax as an aid to international competitive- 
ness  since VATs  are levied on imports but rebated on exports. The case is 
often stated as follows: an  income tax is paid by producers of exports but not 
by foreign producers of the goods we import, while a VAT  is paid on imports 
but not on exports. Surely, say the proponents of this view, this means that 
countries that have a VAT have an advantage in international competition over 
countries that rely on income taxation. 
In fact, this argument is wrong. A VAT  is not, contrary to popular belief, 
anything  like  a tariff-cum-export  subsidy.  Indeed, a  VAT  is  no  more  an 
inherently procompetitive trade policy than a universal sales tax, to which an 
“idealized”  VAT,  levied equally on all consumption,  is in fact equivalent. 
The point  that VATs  do not  inherently  affect  international  trade  flows has 
been  well recognized  in  the  international tax literature.’  This point  is  also 
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familiar  to  tax  policy  practitioners;  McLure  (1987),  to  take  a  recent 
example, dismisses the competitive argument for a VAT as evident nonsense. 
Yet  the  belief  that  VATs  are  important  determinants  of  international 
competitiveness persists among laymen. 
In large part, the belief  that VATs  are trade-distorting  policies reflects a 
failure  on  the  part  of  noneconomists  to  understand  the  basic  economic 
arguments. There is also another factor, however:  in reality, VATs  will not be 
neutral  in  their effect on trade,  for at least two reasons. First,  VATs  are a 
substitute  for  other  taxes,  especially  income  taxes,  that  do  affect  trade. 
Second, in practice,  a VAT  will  not be neutral; concern over distributional 
issues, as well as administrative difficulties, inevitably leads to a tax whose 
rate varies substantially across industries. 
To acknowledge that in practice a VAT  will indeed affect trade flows is not 
the same as saying that the lay  view is right.  In fact, the widespread view 
that a VAT  enhances the international competitiveness (in some sense) of the 
country that adopts it may well be the reverse of the truth. To the extent that 
a VAT  taxes traded goods more heavily  than  nontraded,  which is normally 
the case, a VAT  in practice probably tends to reduce rather than increase the 
size of a country’s traded goods sector. Against this may be set the favorable 
effect on saving and hence on a country’s trade balance in the short run of 
substituting  a consumption  tax  for taxes, like  the  income  tax,  that distort 
intertemporal consumption choices. 
The purpose of this  paper is to lay  out a simple analytical approach  for 
thinking about the effects of a VAT  on international trade. The paper begins 
by  laying  out a simple three-good,  two-period  model that has the  minimal 
elements necessary  to discuss the international  trade effects of a VAT.  The 
first section describes the model and shows how equilibrium is determined in 
the  absence  of  taxation.  The  second  section  introduces  a  VAT  and 
demonstrates in the context of  our model the well-known fundamental point 
that an idealized VAT  that is levied on all production is nondistortionary,  in 
particular  having  no effect on the  allocation of  resources  between  tradable 
and nontradable sectors. We can also show that such an idealized VAT  would 
leave nominal  factor  prices  measured  in foreign  currency  unchanged;  this 
argues, in effect, that even in the short run under fixed exchange rates a VAT 
should not be expected to have any effect on trade. 
We  show  next  that  the  absence  of  distortionary  effects  from  a  VAT 
depends on precisely the feature that is often alleged to constitute an unfair 
trade advantage, namely, the rebate of value-added taxes on exports. In the 
absence of  an export rebate, a VAT  would  act like an export tax-which  in 
general equilibrium is equivalent to an import tariff. Thus, the export rebate 
is necessary  if  a VAT  is not to be protectionist. 
The remainder  of  the  paper  is  devoted  to reasons  why  in  practice  the 
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may  substitute for an income tax; since an income tax is not neutral in its 
effects, the substitution will have allocative effects, tending, other things being 
equal, to improve the trade balance in the short run. Second, and offsetting this 
effect in the short run and persisting in the long run, a VAT in practice will tend 
to be levied more heavily on traded than on nontraded output and will therefore 
tend to shift resources out of the traded goods sectors. 
On balance, the substitution of value-added taxation for income taxation is 
likely to have an uncertain short-run effect on a nation’s net exports but is 
likely to reduce net exports in the longer term. This does not constitute an 
argument either for or against introducing a VAT;  indeed, even if  the effect 
on competitiveness were unambiguous, it is by  no means clear what policy 
moral ought to be drawn. The point of this analysis is more modest; we want 
to  show  that  the  common  belief  that  a  VAT  is  a  kind  of  disguised 
protectionist policy is based on a misunderstanding. 
7.1  A Basic Model 
The analysis of the international effect of a VAT  has several strands. These 
strands dictate the  necessary content of  our model.  First,  a VAT  is often 
alleged to favor traded goods production over nontraded goods in general; 
thus, we need to have a model in which some goods are nontraded. Second, 
the  apparent  differential  taxation  of  exports  and  imports  resulting  from 
export rebates has been praised and  attacked; thus,  we  need  to  make the 
distinction between importables and exportables. Finally, a consumption tax 
like a VAT  differs from an income tax in its effect on the choice between 
consumption  and  saving;  thus,  we  need  to  have  a  model  that  allows 
intertemporal  trade-offs.  Putting  these  together,  in  order  to  discuss  the 
international economics of  a VAT  we need at minimum a model with three 
goods (exports, imports, and nontraded) and with two periods (present and 
future).  At  times,  it  will  be  helpful  to  consider more  collapsed models, 
aggregating the  two  tradable  sectors  or  eliminating  the  time  dimension; 
however, a three-good, two-period model will be our base in this paper. 
Consider, then,  a country that produces and  consumes three goods:  an 
exported  good  X,  an  imported  good  M,  and  a  nontraded  good  N. The 
economy lasts for two periods, 1 and 2. The country will be assumed to be 
small on both world goods markets and world financial markets, in the sense 
that it can trade X for M at a fixed relative price in each period  and can 
borrow or lend at a fixed real interest rate in terms of traded goods. 
The technology of production is assumed to be standard neoclassical, with 
perfect competition prevailing. In the first period, the economy’s production 
possibilities may be  summarized by  a trade-off  among the outputs of  the 
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Some first-period production may be used to form capital, which expands 
production  possibilities  in  the  second period.  It is unnecessary  to define a 
capital aggregate; we can simply define Kl, I  = X,  M,  N  as the quantity of 
each good set aside to enhance second-period production. The second-period 
transformation function may thus be written 
(2)  T2(Qi,  Q&, Qk, Kx,  KM,  KN)  = 0. 
Turning next to the demand side, we ignore issues of income distribution 
and treat the economy in terms of the income and tastes of  a representative 
individual.  Preferences  of  this  representative  individual  may  be written  in 
terms of  a welfare function, 
(3) 
Like the production technology,  this welfare function is assumed to exhibit 
all the usual properties. 
The country is assumed to be a price taker on world markets. With slight 
loss  of  generality,  we  assume  that  nominal  prices  of  X  and M in  foreign 
currency are constant: 
w = U(C&,  CL, C&) + SU(Ci,  C&, Ck). 
(4)  P;  = P;,  I  = x,  M,  t  = 1, 2. 
The loss of generality here lies not in the absence of foreign inflation, which 
could be introduced without any change in results, but in the assumption that 
our country's  terms of  trade are the same in both periods.  This assumption 
could be relaxed without any significant change in our analysis, but it saves 
on complexity and notation. 
We  also assume that the country can borrow or lend freely at an interest 
rate r*. 
Now  let  us  consider  the  equilibrium  conditions  of  the  model.  In  each 
period, the consumption of nontraded goods must equal production, less that 
part of production that (in the first period) is set aside for investment. Thus, 
we have 
(5)  C,& = Q,& -  KN, 
(6)  C;  = Qk. 
For traded goods, the constraint is much looser since the country can both 
exchange goods within each period  and borrow  or lend  across periods.  The 
only constraint is that the present value of traded goods production that is not 
invested must equal the present value of traded goods consumption: 
(7)  Pi(Q4 - K,)  + PL(Q& -  KM) + (1 + r*)-'  [pie; + P&Q&] 
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To solve the model, we must determine prices. In the absence of taxation, 
the prices of the traded goods are simply determined by  their international 
prices: 
p; = p; = p*  (8)  I. 
The  price  of  the  nontraded  good  is  determined  in  each  period  by  the 
requirement that supply equal demand. Supply is determined by maximiza- 
tion of  the present value of  marketed production, 
Demand  is  determined  by  maximization  of  (3)  subject  to  the  budget 
constraint. 
Equilibrium may be usefully illustrated using figure 7.1. On the axes are 
the nominal prices of  the nontraded  good in each period. The curve N,N, 
represents  points consistent  with  market  clearing  for N  in  period  1;  it  is 
downward  sloping  under  the  usual  assumption  that  excess  demand  for 
the good is decreasing in its own price and increasing in prices of substitutes. 
The curve Ng2  similarly represents  points consistent with market clearing 
for N  in period  2. We  show N,N, steeper  than N2N2, which  will  be  the 
case  as  long  as  “own”  effects  are  larger  than  “cross”  effects.  (This 
assumption  about  relative  slopes  may  also  be  thought  of  as  a  stability 
condition since it is necessary  for convergence  under  most  quasi-dynamic 
stories about price adjustment.) Equilibrium is where the curves intersect, at 
point E. 
We  now have a basic model of  resource allocation in a trading economy, 
both across sectors and over time. We can now introduce a value-added tax 
and examine its effects. 
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7.2  Effects of an Idealized Value-Added Tax 
We  now  consider  the  effect  of  introducing  a  value-added  tax  into this 
economy.  This tax will be  “idealized,”  in the sense that it will be assumed 
to be successfully levied at a flat rate on all production for consumption.  In 
reality, VATS do not meet this ideal, both because of legislated differences in 
rates  and  exemptions  and because  of  the  impossibility  of  actually  taxing 
important parts of production.  Although these departures from the ideal are 
of  critical importance in evaluating the likely effects of an actual VAT,  the 
idealized VAT  is a useful reference point with  which to begin  our analysis 
since such an idealized VAT  is implicit in most economists’ discussions of 
the effects of  a VAT  on international trade. 
We  suppose,  then,  that  any  firm  selling  a  good  domestically  must  pay 
taxes at a rate T on the value of the good, less any value-added taxation that 
the  firm  can demonstrate  has been  paid  on productive  inputs.  Investment 
goods are included in this deduction, so that in effect investment is exempt 
from the VAT.  Sales of imported goods must pay the full tax rate. Exported 
goods, since they are not sold domestically, are not subject to the tax; thus, 
exporters receive a full rebate. Tax revenue is redistributed to consumers in a 
nondistorting fashion. 
Let us define the prices of goods to domestic consumers as 
Pi,  I  = X,  M,N,  t  = 1, 2. 
The price of imported goods is simply the international price plus the tax: 
(10)  & = PL(1 + T),  = 1, 2. 
Since a producer  of  export goods  must  be  indifferent  between  selling  the 
goods domestically or on the world market, and since tax is paid on domestic 
but not foreign sales, the internal price of the exported good must also equal 
the international price plus the tax: 
(1 1) 
The price of N in each period continues to be determined by market clearing. 
Supply, however, now reflects the presence of the VAT:  firms will maximize 
the value of output net of  taxation, 
(12) 
pi = p*  x(1 + T),  l  = 1, 2. 
V = (1 + ~)-l{f‘;(Q&  - Kx)  + P&(Q& -  KM)  + PA(QA -  KN) 
+ (1 + r*)-’[P;Q;  + P&Q& + P@,$]}. 
We  may now assert the following: imposition of  a VAT  at the rate T  will 
raise the consumer price of the nontraded good in each period by the fraction 
T, thus  leaving  all relative  prices  unchanged;  as a result,  there  will  be  no 
change  either  in  the  allocation  of  resources  or  in  welfare.  Figure  7.2 
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Fig. 7.2 
diagram with consumer prices of N  on the axes, the effect of  a VAT  is to 
shift  both  N,N, and N2N2 out, to N;N;  and N;N;, respectively;  the  new 
equilibrium  is  at E,  with  the price of  the nontraded  good  increased  by  a 
fraction T in both periods. 
To see why this must be true, we first note by inspection of (12) that, if 
consumer prices of all goods rise exactly in proportion to the VAT,  there is 
no effect on production incentives. So, if all prices rise so as to offset the 
VAT,  there will be no change in the allocation of resources or production. 
Second, we argue that under the hypothesized  solution there  will be no 
effect on demand. The simplest way to see this is to notice that the welfare 
function (3) implies a set of compensated demand functions, 
(13)  Cj=Hf(p,W), I=X,M,N,  t=  1,2, 
where p is the vector of present-value consumer prices. The functions H(.) 
are homogeneous of degree zero in p;  so, if  all consumer prices rise in the 
same  proportion  while  welfare  is  unchanged,  then  demand  will  be 
unchanged. But, if nothing changes, nothing changes, including welfare; so, 
when all prices rise by T,  the market for nontraded goods continues to clear 
in each period. 
An  idealized  VAT,  then,  has  no  allocative  effects.  In  particular,  it  is 
neither  procompetitive  nor  anticompetitive;  whatever  your  definition  of 
competitiveness, it has no effect at all. 
Many  general  equilibrium  results,  such  as  the  equivalence  of  a  VAT 
without an export rebate to an import tariff, to which we will refer in the 
next  section,  depend on the  assumption  that  nominal  price  levels do not 
matter. Thus, their practical relevance depends either on price flexibility or 
on an  appropriate exchange rate  adjustment.  The assertion  that  a  VAT  is 
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much defense. Because consumer prices  rise precisely  in proportion  to the 
tax,  the  net  prices  to  producers  are  unchanged.  The  marginal  revenue 
product  of  factors  of  production  must  also  be  unchanged.  So  (to  step 
slightly outside the model), even if  factor prices  and/or producer prices  are 
sticky  and the exchange rate is fixed, a VAT  will  still have no competitive 
effect. 
Perhaps the  surprising point  is that this  absence  of  a competitive  effect 
occurs despite the rebate of  VAT  on exports, which is widely regarded  as a 
kind  of  export  subsidy.  In  fact,  as  we  show  in  the  next  section,  in  the 
absence of an export rebate a VAT  would distort allocation, definitely reduce 
export production,  and  probably  shift resources  on  net  away  from  traded 
goods sectors. 
7.3  The Role of Border Tax Adjustments 
The controversy over VATs  is largely generated by the impression that the 
border  tax  adjustments-the  fact that imports are subject to the  tax  while 
exports have the tax rebated-constitute  a policy favoring a country’s traded 
goods sectors.  It is therefore interesting to ask how  a VAT  would function 
without these adjustments. 
Perhaps the simplest case would be a system with no border adjustments at 
all-that  is, no VAT  collected on imports, no rebate on exports. This would 
in effect shift the tax from a “destination”  basis to an “origin”  basis.  The 
effects  of  such  a  system  may  be  derived  immediately  by  the  following 
observations.  First,  the  prices  to  consumers  of  exports and  imports will 
clearly remain unchanged; thus, the price to producers net of taxation  must 
fall in proportion to the VAT  rate. Clearly, if the price of the nontraded good 
also remains the same to consumers, that is, if the price net of taxes to firms 
falls by the size of  the tax, then producers will have no incentive to change 
their  output  mix.  At the  same time, if  no relative  prices  change, then  at 
unchanged utility consumers will also leave their choices unchanged. But, if 
nothing  happens,  nothing  happens;  so  the  VAT  without  border  tax 
adjustments is neutral  in the same way as a VAT  with these adjustments.’ 
The difference in this case is, of course, that the nominal marginal product 
of  factors of  production in foreign currency falls. Thus, in the case without 
border  tax  adjustments,  there  must  be  either  price  flexibility  or  (more 
plausibly) a currency depreciation in order for the neutrality of  the VAT  to 
hold.  This  in  turn  helps  explain  why  in  practice  VATs  do in  fact  include 
border adjustments. 
It is also true that,  given the general preference  among authorities for a 
subtraction  method  of  administration,  it  would  be  awkward  to  exempt 
imports from the tax.  Firms would be given an imputation of taxes paid on 
imports, as opposed to showing proof of actual payment on domestic inputs; 
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of the lower administrative costs. Partly for this reason, it seems likely that a 
country  pressured  into  avoiding  any  border  adjustments  would  end  up 
without an export rebate but would  still tax imports. In this case, the VAT 
would  have  a  distortionary  effect  on  the  allocation  of  resources.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, this effect is essentially protectionist-a  VAT  without an export 
rebate is equivalent to an import tariff. 
The difference between a VAT  with and without an export rebate may be 
seen  in  the  export  pricing  condition.  Without  the  rebate,  arbitrage  will 
ensure that the consumer price of exportables equals the world price because 
the producer pays the tax whether the good is exported or sold domestically. 
Thus, 
Pfi = P;,  t  = I, 2. 
Comparing this with (1 l), we see that the rebate-less VAT  leads to a lower 
export price. This is not surprising since we have in effect added an export 
tax to the idealized VAT  described before. 
The internal price of exports relative to imports is of course lower in this 
case-or,  to reverse the point, the relative price of imports is higher. It is a 
general proposition,  the so-called Lerner symmetry theorem,  that an export 
tax and an import tax are equivalent in their general equilibrium effects. So 
an ideal VAT  without an export rebate is like a protectionist policy. 
We should note, however, that the equivalence between import and export 
taxes is one of those propositions that depends either on nominal prices not 
mattering or on an appropriate exchange rate adjustment. Note that the effect 
of a VAT  without a rebate is to lower the price to producers of the exported 
good, when measured in foreign currency; a tariff would of course raise the 
price of  the imported good  instead.  Thus, these are only equivalent,  given 
either an exchange rate adjustment or sufficient price flexibility. 
We see, then, that a VAT  without an export adjustment would in effect be 
a protectionist measure. Will it increase or decrease  “competitiveness”  as 
measured by the size of the traded goods sector? The answer is ambiguous, 
but a presumption may be offered that the size of the traded goods sector as 
a whole   ill decrease.  To see this, it is helpful to collapse the model into a 
single  period,  ignoring  the  intertemporal  aspect  (which  is  in  any  case 
unimportant for this question). Equilibrium in the one-period version of  the 
model may be analyzed using a diagram suggested by Dornbusch (1974) and 
shown  in  figure  7.3.  On the  axes  are  the  consumer prices  of  X  and  M, 
relative  to  the  consumer  price  of  N. The curve NN represents  a  locus  of 
points  for  which  the  market  for nontraded  goods  clears:  it  is  downward 
sloping because a rise in either traded good’s relative price will shift demand 
onto and resources out of the nontraded sector. The ray OT has a slope equal 
to the consumer price of imports relative to exports, which is determined by 
world prices  and the tax system. Equilibrium occurs where this ray crosses 
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Fig. 7.3 
Now  suppose that the rebate on exports were to be removed from a VAT. 
Then  the  ratio  of  import  to  export  prices  would  rise  by  the  fraction  T, 
corresponding to  a  counterclockwise rotation  of  OT  to  OT'. Equilibrium 
would shift from E to E'. 
Clearly, the resulting rise in PM/PN  would tend to shift resources out of the 
nontraded sector, while the fall in PxIPN would tend to shift resources into 
N.  The overall effect on the size of N  is therefore ambiguous. However, we 
may offer a presumption that the net effect on N is positive and therefore that 
the net effect on traded goods sectors as a whole is negative. 
The reason for this  presumption is  the probable relative importance of 
demand  and  supply  adjustment  in  the  exporting  and  import-competing 
sectors.  A  tariff  reduces  exports  and  imports  by  an  equal  amount.  The 
reduction  comes  about  through  a  combined  reduction  in  demand  and 
increase in  supply for  the  importable  and  on  the  export  side  through  a 
combination of  increased demand  and  reduced supply.  Initially, however, 
demand exceeds supply for the  importable,  while supply exceeds demand 
for the exportable.  Thus,  more  of  the  exportable  side will  tend to  come 
from  supply and  less from  demand than  on the import  side-that  is,  we 
would  expect  exportable  production  at  world  prices  to  fall  more  than 
import-competing production rises. Thus, the size of  the tradable sector as 
a whole will typically fall. 
A  specific  example  may  make  the  point.  Consider  an  economy  that 
produces but does not itself consume its export good and that consumes but 
does  not  produce  its  import  good-an  extreme  form  of  the  general 
proposition  that  countries  must  have  excess  supply  for  exportables  and 
excess demand for importables. When such an economy imposes a tariff or 
export  tax,  the  export  sector necessarily  shrinks,  and,  since there  is  no 
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extreme case, the effect of  a tax on trade, such as a VAT  without an export 
rebate, will unambiguously be to shrink the size of  the traded goods sector. 
Adding some import-competing production and some domestic demand for 
exportables will remove the certainty of  this outcome, but it will still be a 
presumption. 
We  see, then, that the widespread belief that the use of export rebates in a 
value-added tax  system is questionable and perhaps an unfair protectionist 
device is very nearly the opposite of  the truth. In fact, the export rebate is 
necessary  if  the  VAT  is  not  to  have  a  protectionist effect,  reducing  the 
volume of trade and probably reducing the size of the tradable sector. 
7.4  The Idealized VAT  as a Substitute for an  Income Tax 
The best case for arguing that a VAT  enhances competitiveness is not what 
it does but what it doesn't do: a VAT,  unlike an income tax, does not place a 
tax on saving. Thus, to the extent that a VAT  substitutes for an income tax, it 
will tend to reduce the current propensity to consume. As many economists 
have pointed out (see, in particular, Frenkel and Rain 1988), to the extent 
that  a value-added  tax  that  substitutes for  an  income tax  reduces current 
consumption, it will in turn will tend to lead to a trade surplus in the short 
run.  A trade surplus, other things equal,  tends to increase the  size of  the 
traded goods sector. 
In order to demonstrate this point,  we introduce an income tax into our 
basic model. 
We  already  know  that  an  idealized VAT  does not  distort  the economy, 
relative to a no-tax equilibrium. Thus, in making the comparison of  a VAT 
and an income tax, it is sufficient to consider the effects of  an income tax. 
So we now examine the effects of imposing on our economy an income tax 
at  a  proportional  rate  T.  Proceeds  of  this  tax,  like  those  of  the  VAT 
considered earlier, are assumed to be redistributed in a nondistorting fashion. 
It is important to specify how profit income is calculated for tax purposes. 
The most natural assumption here is that both earnings on foreign investments 
and earnings on capital are treated  as part of  second-period income, with 
profits  calculated  as  the  difference  between  sales  and  factor  costs  plus 
depreciation on capital-but,  since the economy only lasts two periods, the 
whole capital stock is depreciated. There is a potential issue over whether 
depreciation should be calculated at historical or replacement cost, but our 
assumption of constant prices on world markets allows us to ignore the issue 
here. 
Income in the first period, then, is the value of production less taxes, plus 
whatever transfer the government makes: 
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Income in the second period is 
(16)  I2 = (1 - T)[P~Q~  + P&Q& + P&Q&] + (1 - ~)r*[PiQi 
-  Pic4 + PtQL -  Pact + PAQA -  PAC;]  + L2. 
Here, the first term represents factor income, that is, gross domestic product. 
The second term represents capital consumption allowances.  The third term 
represents the income from net foreign investment.  Finally,  the fourth term 
represents the rebate from the government. 
Now  consider  an  individual’s  budget  constraint.  In  the  first period, the 
individual accumulates  wealth  equal to the difference between  income and 
consumption expenditures: 
In the second period, the value of  consumption equals income plus wealth: 
From  inspection  of  (16)-(18),  it  is  now  immediately  apparent  that  the 
presence of the tax distorts the incentives of a consumer. An individual who 
takes  the  government  rebates  as given  faces  a rate  of  return  of  r*(l  - T) 
rather than r* on deferred consumption.  For a small income tax, which will 
have a second-order effect on welfare, the result must be a substitution effect 
that induces consumers to consume more in the  first period  and less in the 
second. 
To  analyze the  trade consequences  of  this  disincentive  to save,  we turn 
once again to the diagrammatic analysis of nontraded goods prices. In figure 
7.4, the curves N,N, and N2N2 represent market clearing for the nontraded 
goods  market  in  the  first  and  second  period,  respectively.  Imposing  an 
income  tax  shifts consumption  from the  second  period  to  the  first.  Thus, 
other things being equal, demand for first period N rises, shifting N,N, up to 
NiN;;  other things being equal, demand for second period  N  falls, shifting 
N2N2 down to NiN;. Thus, the result is to shift the equilibrium from E  to 
E’, raising  PN in the first period  and lowering it in the second.  The initial 
effect  of  an income  tax  is, therefore,  to draw  resources  out of  the  traded 
goods sectors and into the nontraded sector, thereby reducing exports and the 
production of  import substitutes. 
In passing, it may be worth noting that, in an economy such as this, which, 
although  small  in  world  goods  and  financial  markets,  does  produce  a 
nontraded good, it is not the case that changes in the saving rate affect only 
the  balance  of  payments,  without  affecting  domestic  real  interest  rates.  It 
is true that the real rate of interest in terms of traded goods remains fixed at 
r*  by assumption.  A real interest rate defined in terms of a basket of  either 
domestic production or domestic consumption will, however,  change when- 
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Fig. 7.4 
income tax will imply deflation of domestic prices relative to world prices 
from period  1 to period 2, and will thus be measured as a rise in the real 
domestic interest  rate.  In  this  sense,  the  income  tax  produces  domestic 
crowding out as well as a shift toward trade deficit. 
We  have now seen that an income tax, in contrast to a VAT,  does reduce 
the size of  the traded goods sector. It is now straightforward to analyze the 
effect of introducing a VAT  that substitutes for an income tax. The VAT  has 
no competitive effect; the reduction in the income tax expands trade. Thus, 
the overall effect is to shift resources into tradables. 
It is important, however, to note that this is true only in the first period. In 
the  second  period,  PN falls,  and  the  traded  goods  sector  is  presumably 
smaller. The point is that the short-term increase in net exports leads to an 
accumulation of overseas assets that eventually finances an excess of imports 
over exports. 
7.5  Effects of a Selective VAT 
We  have so far considered only an idealized VAT  that succeeds in taxing 
all consumption at  the  same rate.  In  practice,  value-added  taxation does 
not  fall  equally  on  all  activities.  In  part,  this  is  because  of  practical 
difficulties: nonmarketed production, ranging from do-it-yourself repairs to 
the services of  owner-occupied housing and consumer durables, cannot be 
taxed.  Also,  social considerations, rightly or  wrongly,  frequently lead  to 
exemptions for medical care, education, and various other activities that are 
deemed  inappropriate for  taxation.  As  a  matter  of  practice,  many  other 
services are frequently exempted from VATS. Among OECD countries with 
value-added  taxes,  the  VAT  typically applies to  only  about  two-thirds of 
total  consumption and  often  has  lower rates  for  some products  than  for 
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For the purposes of this paper, the important point is that the de facto and 
de jure  exemptions from a VAT  are likely to  fall primarily on  nontraded 
rather  than  traded  goods  and  services.  This  is  necessarily  true  of 
nonmarketed production and for one reason or another is also true of most of 
the  marketed  areas that  are  likely to  be  exempted or  subject to  reduced 
taxation. 
The  effect  of  a  selective  VAT  is,  therefore,  to  increase  nontradable 
consumption and production at the expense of tradable. Imports and exports 
are both reduced by  the imposition of the typical VAT. 
To  see this more formally, we return to our basic model. It will simplify 
matters at no cost if  we take advantage of  the assumption of an unchanged 
relative price of  exports and imports to aggregate X  and M  into a composite 
traded good T.  We  represent the differential taxation of nontraded and traded 
goods in extreme form by supposing that, while domestic consumption of  T 
is subject to a value-added tax at a rate T,  consumption of N  is nontaxed. 
Firms in the economy will maximize the present value of production after 
taxes, 
Clearly,  the presence  of  the  tax  acts  as  a disincentive to  produce traded 
goods. 
To think about the equilibrium that results, it is helpful once again to start 
by  collapsing the model into a single period. In figure 7.5, the curve QQ 
represents the economy’s production possibility frontier between N and T.  In 
a one-period model, trade must be balanced, implying equality of supply and 
demand for T as well as N; thus, consumption must lie on this production 
possibility frontier. The optimum consumption is  shown  as E, where  the 
T 
Q 
Fig. 7.5 277  International Trade Effects of  Value-Added Taxation 
PPF is tangent to the highest possible indifference curve. With a selected 
VAT  on traded goods, however, consumption is distorted; the equilibrium is 
at a point like E', where PP represents consumer prices and PP  the marginal 
rate of transformation in production. As shown, the relative price of tradable 
faced by  consumers is higher than that faced by  firms, and the result is a 
smaller traded goods sector. 
In the two-period model, the basic effect is the same. Figure 7.6 shows 
initial equilibrium loci  at NINl and Ng2,  respectively. The effect of  the 
VAT,  other things being equal, is to raise the demand for the nontraded good 
in each period. Thus, both schedules shift out. While it is possible that the 
net effect could be to lower Phi in one period, ordinarily both prices will rise. 
Meanwhile, the  net  price of  T  to producers will  remain unchanged  since 
producers must remain indifferent between producing for the domestic and 
the  world  market. Thus, the rise in  the price of  N  will  induce a shift of 
resources out of  the traded goods sector. 
A selective VAT  that falls most heavily on traded goods, then, will tend to 
hurt the traded goods sectors of  an economy-the  reverse of  the common 
belief. In addition, there is the effect noted in the last section: to the extent that 
a VAT  substitutes for an income tax, while it will in the short run encourage 
saving and therefore net exports, in the long run the resulting accumulation of 
net foreign assets will have the opposite effect on net exports. 
7.6  Conclusions 
There is a widespread belief that value-added taxation, because it is levied 
on imports and rebated on exports, acts as a combination of  protection and 
export subsidy, giving the traded  goods sectors of countries with  VATS an 
advantage over the corresponding sectors of  countries that rely on  income 
taxation. In this paper, we have used a simple model to show that this view is 
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almost completely wrong. A VAT is not a protectionist measure; indeed, the 
allegedly procompetitive device of  export rebates is necessary if the VAT  is 
not to act as an export tax, which in turn is actually a protectionist measure 
that would reduce both imports and exports. To  the extent that a VAT does 
improve competitiveness, it does so in the short run by offering less bias 
against saving than an income tax, which, other things being equal, tends to 
improve the trade balance-but  which is far from the common belief about 
why VATS are helpful in international competition. Moreover, in the longer 
term,  the  resulting  accumulation of  foreign investment would  lead  to  an 
increase of imports in excess of exports. In practice, moreover, a VAT would 
almost surely fall more heavily on traded rather than nontraded goods, which 
would constitute a bias against both exports and imports. 
Notes 
1. An  early  treatment  is  Shibata  (1967).  For  a  modem  and  especially  neat 
statement of  the point, see Grossman (1980); for a brief statement, see Dixit (1985). 
2.  Hamilton and Whalley (1986) have pointed out that, given the nonuniformity of 
tax rates across goods in practice, there is a difference between destination and origin 
systems. To  take  an  extreme  example,  imagine  a  country  that  places  a  VAT  on 
importables but not exportables. In a VAT  with border tax adjustments, such a system 
is in effect a consumption tax on the importable, with no tax on domestic producers; 
without  the  border  adjustrnents,it  becomes  a  production  tax,  with  no  tax  on 
consumers.  We  abstract  from  this  issue  in  this  paper;  Hamilton  and  Whalley 
demonstrate that it is relatively unimportant quantitatively. 
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Comment  Avinash Dixit 
A  long  line  of  literature  on  the  value-added  tax  (VAT)  has  exposed  the 
fallacy of the  common  view  that, because  a VAT  is levied on imports and 
rebated  on exports,  it  constitutes  a  tariff-cum+xport  subsidy:  an  unfair 
advantage  if  other nations  practice  it and something  desirable  if  we  do it. 
McLure  (1987,  56) says  of  the  common  view,  “Although  this  patently 
absurd argument is heard less frequently now than in earlier episodes of the 
continuing debate of  the pros and cons of the VAT,  it is encountered  often 
enough that it deserves brief discussion.”  Feldstein and Krugman begin with 
a lengthy discussion;  one would have hoped that a briefer one would have 
sufficed. Then some of their new contributions could have been discussed in 
greater depth. 
I  particularly  liked  two points  that are a  very  substantial  advance  over 
previous  work.  The  first  is  the  treatment  of  short-run  and  disequilibrium 
situations.  They examine  the consequences  of  stickiness of  nominal prices 
and exchange rates in a much clearer manner than the catalogs that one finds 
in  the literature.  The second is their  analysis of  a selective  VAT.  Previous 
work  sets up the benchmark  of  a uniform  VAT  and  makes  some informal 
remarks  about what  would  happen  in the absence  of  uniformity.  Feldstein 
and Krugman offer a more complete model. 
Their focus  is on the consumption  versus income  tax  distinction and on 
production shifts among the export, import, and nontradable sectors. Hence, 
a two-period,  three-sector model. I need hardly say that it is deployed with 
great  skill  and  elegance;  one  expects  that  from  these  authors.  Let  me 
concentrate on what the model leaves out. 
First  a  minor  point.  In this  model, the  idealized  VAT  has no allocative 
effects at all. This is because labor supply is fixed exogenously. All of net 
present  value of  production  becomes  the rent  income  of  some unspecified 
fixed factors, and the ideal uniform VAT  acts as a tax on pure rent. In a more 
general model,  it would have some distorting effects. 
Second, while the nature of capital as a produced input is properly  taken 
into  account  in  the  two-period  setting,  no  other  produced  inputs  are 
recognized. In fact, the treatment of intermediate inputs is a vital aspect of a 
VAT  and deserves more attention.  This becomes especially important when 
tax rates are not uniform across goods and in particular  when some sectors 
are  exempt.  In  the  rest  of  my  discussion,  I  shall  extend  the  Feldstein- 
Krugman model to handle this issue. 
In  the  usual  invoice  or credit  method  of  administering  VAT,  there  is  a 
distinction between  exemption  and  zero rating, and the two have different 
effects.  Suppose  the  production  of  nontraded  goods uses  traded  goods  as 
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intermediate inputs. Under zero rating, the producer can claim a refund of 
the tax paid  at  the earlier stage. With plain exemption, sometimes called 
exemption without credit, such a producer is off the VAT  register, not liable 
to pay  tax but  unable to claim a refund of  the tax paid  at earlier stages. 
Both systems are used in practice. In the United Kingdom, for example, food 
is zero rated, but insurance and finance are exempt. In most systems, exports 
are zero rated; nonmarketed commodities are by their nature exempt. 
The Krugman-Feldstein  analysis extends easily to intermediate inputs when 
nontraded goods are zero rated. But exemption brings new problems. Since the 
producers of an exempt good pay the tax-inclusive price for their purchases of 
inputs of taxed goods, a production distortion is introduced. In their figure 7.5, 
the new production point E' moves into the interior of  the feasible set. 
If  an exempt good is further used in the production of  other taxed goods, 
it breaks the chain of  tax credits. Thus, an element of value added is taxed 
twice, compounding the production distortion. There is also the suspicion 
that an exempt activity sandwiched between two taxed activities will be at an 
actual disadvantage (see McLure 1987, 73). This seems to suggest that the 
tax can lower the outputs of  both kinds of  goods-traded  and  nontraded. 
This is the possibility that I proceed to examine. 
The  economy  produces  two  kinds  of  goods,  traded  (labeled  t) and 
nontraded (labled n). Labor is the only mobile primary factor. Each good is 
produced using labor, another primary factor that is specific to the sector, 
and intermediate input of  the other good. 
The traded good is subject to VAT  at rate T;  the nontraded good is exempt 
(not zero rated).  Fix  the world price of  the traded  good at one; then the 
domestic producer price is one and the domestic consumer price is (1 + T). 
To focus on the production effects, assume a constant domestic marginal rate 
of  substitution in  consumption,  and  normalize it  at  unity.  Then,  for the 
nontraded  good,  the  domestic  price  (consumer  as  well  as  producer)  is 
(1 + T). Let w denote the wage rate. 
Assume that the cost function for the traded good is 
where  4'  is  the  usual  increasing,  concave,  linearly  homogeneous  cost 
function,  and  kt > 0 because of  the  presence of  the  fixed  factor.  (This 
assumes a production function that is Cobb-Douglas in the fixed factor and a 
labor-nontraded composite. This is a special form, but one that yields results 
in instructive parametric form.) Similarly, suppose the cost function for the 
nontraded good is 
Note that the tax-inclusive price must be paid for traded good inputs. 
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and 
(2)  1 + T  = (1 + p.,)  QP w(w,  1 + 7). 
Finally, suppose the supply of labor is exogenously fixed at L. Then the labor 
market equilibrium condition is 
(3) 
Equations (1)-(3) determine Qt, Q,,  and w. 
Note that the tax parameter T affects the equilibrium in three roles. One is 
by  raising the producer price of  the nontraded good-the  left-hand side of 
(2). This is the role studied by  Krugman and Feldstein. The second is by 
raising  the  cost  of  nontraded  inputs  for  the  traded  good  sector-the 
right-hand side of (1). The third is the cost of traded inputs for the nontraded 
good  sector-the  right-hand side of  (2)-which  arises because the  traded 
sector is exempt rather than zero rated. It is conceptually useful to separate 
these roles. Therefore, I shall label the (1 + T)  occurring in the three places 
differently when carrying out the comparative statics.  Let  a,  p, y be  the 
labels  for  the  three  roles  mentioned  above,  in  that  order.  Then  the 
equilibrium conditions are 
Q:+Fr  ww(w,  1 + T) + QfifPn $;(w,  1 + T)  = L. 




01  = (1 + p.,)  QP  V(w,  Y), 
Q:+Pf  $Lb,  P) + Q!,+Fn  4$w,  y) = L. 




o = p., Q, + e, G + (1 - e,$, 
B  =  Q,  + 8,  B + (1 - ez)q, 
and 
xt[(l + PJQ, - (1 - e,)Ut(s - 811 + x,[(1  + F,)Q, 
- (1 - e,)u,(a -  4)3 = 0. 
For  i = n, t, the  Oi  are  the  distributive  shares  of  labor  in  the  labor- 
intermediate composite,  the ui  are the  elasticities of  substitution between 
labor  and  the  intermediate input,  and  the  Xj are the  proportions of  labor 
employed in the sectors. 
Substitute for the Qi from (4)  and (5)  into (6),  and simplify. Let 
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and 
A  = ht[Or~,  + (1 -  O,)U,]  + ~,[O,W, + (1 -  O,)U,,]. 
Then 
Using this in (4) and (5) gives the solutions for Q, and Q,. 
The expression  (7) clarifies  the  different  roles  played  by  the  tax.  Most 
important, the effect of  each input-cost-increasing  role  on the demand  for 
labor is governed by  a balance between  the diseconomies  of  scale and  the 
elasticity of  substitution parameters.  A large wj  leads to a large reduction in 
the scale of production and therefore a reduction in labor demand; a large ui 
means a more rapid switch to labor-intensive techniques. 
I shall omit further elaboration of  these different effects and merely  state 
what happens when we recognize that in fact 
n 
& = p = 9 = 1+7. 
We  find 
I\ 
6il-t~  = 1 - A,w,/A. 
Then (4) gives 
(8) 
A 
~,Qt/l  +T =  -($[I  - h,w,/A] - (1 - 0,) 
= O,h,w,/A - 1 < 0. 
Similarly, from (5) we have 
(9) 
= O,X,v,/A  > 0. 
Thus, the  suspicion that the  sector producing  an  exempt good  that  both 
uses and is used in the production of a taxed good might actually be harmed 
by the  tax on the other sector is not borne out. In the limiting  case where 
either of the ui goes to infinity, however, the right-hand  side of  (8) goes to 
negative one and that of (9) to zero; then the gross output of the traded good 
is reduced without any increase in that of  the nontraded good. 
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